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It is not easy to imagine two countries in the Western, industrialized world as 
different-culturally, politically, and socially-as Sweden and the United 
States.* On the one hand we have a nation which to many people embodies 
the very notion of a social welfare state, with a strong labor movement and a 
large public sect0r.l On the other hand we find the quintessential capitalistic 
society, where "welfare" is a dirty word and where ideas of individualism, 
careerism, and free enterprise-even in the post-Reagan period-reign as 
forcefully as ever. Whereas Sweden is small, homogeneous, and unitary, the 
United States is vast, heterogeneous, and federal. Whereas the former is a par- 
liamentary democracy, based on several competing parties, the latter has a 
presidential system with a structure of divided powers and checks and balances. 
To say nothing of the great diversities of nature, economy, ethnicity, religious 
beliefs, e t ~ . ~  
However, this is only one side of the story. An opposing argument, just 
as frequently made, runs as follows. Sweden may be known to the outside 
world for its neutrality and its distinctive model of economics and labor rela- 
tions. During the past couple of decades the country has nevertheless under- 
gone extensive "Americanization" in various ways. American values and prac- 
tices are highly visible in Swedish business, science and technology, commu- 
nication, and art. Most evident is the dominance of American popular cul- 
, ture-music, movies, television, books and magazines, even clothing. Far 
from being independent and strictly neutral, Sweden, like so many other 
European countries, has fallen prey to the greedy jaws of U. S. capitalism.3 
What we are faced with here, clearly, are two incompatible theses, one 
stressing the uniqueness of the Swedish case, the other emphasizing--on a 
perhaps more normative note-the effects of super power dominance over a 
small, dependent nation. In this essay I want to scrutinize the validity of the 
"Americanization" thesis, as it pertains to the Swedish political scene. I will 
do this by focusing on an important but, admittedly, limited area, namely the 
field of electoral politics. 
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Voters in Sweden and the United States went to the polls in the fall of 
1988. Incumbency turned out to be an asset in both countries. In Sweden the 
ruling Social Democrats, who have been in government for 5 1 out of the last 
57 years, managed to retain power despite some turbulence in parts of the 
electorate. In the United States the Republicans for the third time in a row 
won the Presidency, while the Democrats at the same time strengthened their 
majority in Congress. In what ways were the two campaigns similar or dis- 
similar? Which issues were the most significant ones? What strategies were 
used and which overall trends were dominant? Based on what happened in the 
campaigns, is it correct to talk about a convergence or divergence of political 
tendencies in the two countries? 
The Swedish Election Campaign 
The political situation in Sweden has long been characterized by a remarkable 
stability. The party system is almost identical with the one existing 60 years 
ago. The parties in Parliament have remained the same ever since the early 
1920s .~  Changes in voter behavior are rare and minor. Pragmatism and in- 
crementalism are essential features of the system. A spirit of compromise- 
some would say dullness-pervades the political atmosphere.5 
This spirit was momentarily shattered in the election campaign of 1985. 
For the first time in recent memory, the biggest opposition party-the 
Moderates (formerly Conservatives)-launched a vigorous attack against the 
Social Democrats, arguing for a fundamental revision of the whole social 
welfare system. The attack did not win voter approval. The Moderates lost 
support, and the Social Democrats retained government power despite a slight 
set-back in popular votes.6 The 1988 campaign, in contrast, was noticeable 
for its lack of divisive issues and for the mostly low-key tone of the debates. 
One reason for this turn of events may well have been that the 1988 election 
was the first one since the assassination of the Swedish prime minister, Olof 
Palme, on February 28, 1986. Ingvar Carlsson became the new chairman of 
the Social Democratic party and, soon after, prime min i~ te r .~  The long-term 
effects of the assassination remain unclear. But there is no doubt that it af- 
fected the political climate and contributed to a calmer election debate. Another 
reason for the absence of divisive issues was the Social Democrats' strategy to 
remove such issues from the political agenda, either by ignoring them or by 
simply co-opting them. 
However, the 1988 campaign did not lack controversial issues altogether. 
During the summer preceding the election, two broad and complex questions 
caught the media's attention: The first contained burning environmental issues 
(concern for algal bloom, acid rain, and mass deaths of seals in coastal waters). 
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Not since the 1980 referendum on nuclear power have environmental issues 
figured so prominently in a campaign. The Ecology Party (or "the Greens"), 
formerly a rather insignificant political grouping, benefitted from this heavy 
media exposure and suddenly did very well in the polls.8 The second issue was 
the Ebbe Carlsson "affair." Ebbe Carlsson (no relative of the prime minister), 
a publishing executive in Stockholm with close ties to the Minister of Justice 
Anna-Greta Leijon, had for months been conducting a private search for Olof 
Palme's assassin with the active support of the national police leadership. 
When the news broke in early June, 1988, Anna-Greta Leijon, who had 
authorized Carlsson's investigations, was forced to resign. The ensuing 
televised committee hearings most likely increased people's general mistrust 
of politicians. This, too, benefitted the Greens and helped pave the way for the 
first new party to enter the Swedish Parliament in 70 years.9 
Apart from the success of the Greens, the most remarkable thing about the 
election was the poor showing of the three non-socialist parties (Moderates, 
Liberals, and the Center Party). Together they amassed only 41.8 percent of 
the votes cast, their worst result since the abnormal election of 1940.1° 
Paradoxically, the Social Democrats, despite a loss of three seats in Parlia- 
ment, thus strengthened their position and retained their dominant role in 
- 
Swedish politics.1 l 
Party Percent Seats 
Moderates 18.3 (-3.0) 
Center 11.3 (+1.4) 
Liberals 12.2 (-2.0) 
Social Democrats 43.2 (-1.5) 
Left Party Communists 5.8 (+0.4) 
Ecology Party (Greens) 5.5 (+4.0) 
Others 3.5 (+0.6) 
Table 1. The 1988 Swedish Parliamentary election. 
The table shows each political party's percentage of the votes cast and the number of 
parliamentary seats won. Figures in parentheses indicate changes from the 1985 elec- 
tion. The total number of eligible voters was 6,329,508. Voter turnout was 86 percent. 
Source: Inside Sweden, no. 3 4 ,  1988, p. 4. 
The American Election Campaign 
Few politicians have so dominated the American political scene as did Ronald 
Reagan during most of the 1980s. The Reagan program signified the most 
sweeping set of policy changes in the United States since the New Deal. 
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However, Reagan was not successful in altering the Republican Party's stand- 
ing as the "permanent minority party" in American politics.12 The GOP 
remains primarily a "presidential" party with a strong base in the South and 
Rocky Mountain states. It has made few inroads at the state and local level and 
has not been able, according to recent polls, to surpass the Democrats in terms 
of party identification. There was no party realignment during Reagan's eight 
years in office.13 
The 1988 campaign was based on the Reagan legacy. George Bush, who 
ran as heir apparent to Reagan, seems to have had two principal aims. One 
was to present himself as a man of unquestionable leadership and experience, 
thus contradicting the common image of him as a "wimp." He constantly 
evoked the blessings of "peace and prosperity," a theme which always works 
to the advantage of the incumbent administration. Occasionally Bush talked 
substance, and he did so by deliberately preempting the Democrats on all of 
their major issues-day-care, education, the environment. This strategy could 
be called the positive side of Bush's campaign.14 
Bush's second goal was to portray Governor Michael Dukakis, the Demo- 
cratic nominee, as a reckless Great Society-liberal totally out of touch with 
the American "mainstream." For the first time in many decades, the words 
"liberal" and "liberalism" were turned into something menacing and dangerous 
in a national campaign, almost on a par with foreign doctrines like socialism 
and communism. The Vice President and his handlers relied heavily on televi- 
sion advertising to get their message across. Several controversial commer- 
cials branded the Massachusetts Govemor as soft on crime and unreliable in 
dealing with defense and foreign affairs. This negative side of Bush's campaign 
enabled the Republican candidate to focus on national symbols and traditional 
values-not exactly the ideal battle ground for today's ~ e m o c r a t s . ~ ~  
Michael Dukakis' choice of campaign theme-"Competence, not ideol- 
ogy"-suited the Republicans perfectly. In trying to hide his ideological con- 
victions, Dukakis made a grave strategical error. The idea seems to have been 
to present the Govemor as an effective "doer" who could produce for the whole 
country what he had already done for his home state (the "Massachusetts 
miracle"). But politics is not only about competence; it is also about vision 
and ideology, about the candidates' ideas for building a better society. By 
avoiding these aspects throughout most of his campaign, Dukakis gave his 
opponent a free hand in defining him ideologically. The result was devastat- 
ing. Little did it matter that Dukakis during the last few days of the campaign 
belatedly declared that he was "a liberal in the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt 
and Harry Truman and John ~ e n n e d ~ . " ~ ~  Little did it matter that he also laid 
out a number of rather specific proposals on various issues. Once again the 
Bush camp preempted him and turned media attention towards symbolic ques- 
tions like prison furloughs, the Pledge of Allegiance, the American Civil 
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ties Union, etc. Thus the early lead that Dukakis had enjoyed in the polls 
was quickly reversed.17 
The election produced two winners4eorge Bush and the Democratic 
Party. Bush won the presidency with 54% of the popular vote as opposed to 
46% for Dukakis. The governor only managed to win 10 states with 112 
electoral votes, whereas Bush carried 40 states representing 426 electoral 
votes. But the Democrats increased their already substantial majority in 
Congress, gaining one seat in the Senate and five in the House. In fact, Bush 
became the first 20th-century Republican President to lose net party strength 
in Congress in the same election that put him in office. The GOP even had a 
net loss of state legislative seats, unprecedented for a year when a Republican 
won the White House. The outcome had analysts wonder about Bush's 
mandate and reaffirmed what has been called the "extraordinary split-level 
character of American politics."18 
The Trend toward "Mass Media Elections" 
The influence of the mass media in electoral processes has increased dramati- 
cally over the past decades. For most voters in Western countries, the media- 
especially the electronic media-are now the main sources of information 
about election campaigns.19 Many factors have contributed to the expansion 
of the media, one being the continuing deterioration of the party structure, the 
principal link between candidates and voters20 Of course, parties and candi- 
dates are well aware of the media's pivotal role and plan their campaigns 
accordingly. They have to communicate a persuasive message, and the most 
effective means of doing so is through the media. 
In the United States, a presidential election today is a television election. 
A New York Times reporter even summed up the whole 1988 campaign by 
enumerating the most crucial events on television: 
There was George Bush fighting with Dan Rather on the evening news. Michael 
Dukakis in a Boston studio claiming yet another victory over Jesse Jackson. Mr. 
Dukakis embracing his wife after pulling off a convention speech better than 
television commentators had told the audience he could deliver. Balloons. Mr. Bush 
and President Reagan passing each other on a tannac in New Orleans during the 
Republican convention. More balloons. Dead fish floating in Boston Harbor. Mr. 
Bush on a stage with a hundred police officers. Lloyd Bentsen lecturing Dan 
Quayle on the Kennedy legacy. Mr. Dukakis in a tank. Sinister criminals marching 
throu h a revolving door. George Bush on another stage with another hundred 
cops. 81 
George Bush and Michael Dukakis spent more money on television advertis- 
ing in 1988 than campaigns have ever spent before. Some experts went as far 
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as saying the difference in the last campaign was that Bush outmaneuvered 
Dukakis on television. Said pollster Louis Harris: "The simple story of this 
election is that the Bush commercials have worked and the Dukakis commer- 
cials have not."22 
In Sweden there is no overt political advertising in the electronic media (radio 
and television). In other words, parties and individual candidates are not 
allowed to buy time for commercials. This does not diminish the role of the 
media in Swedish politics. The way parties are covered in the mass media- 
whether negatively, positively, or neutrally-is of great importance to the 
election results. Different socio-economic factors still determine, to a signifi- 
cant degree, how Swedes vote in general elections. But the relation between 
occupation and party affiliation is not as strong today as it was in the early 
1960s. Increasingly, voters tend to cast their ballots according to their posi- 
tions on specific issues. They also tend to postpone their choices to a later 
stage in the campaigns.23 All these tendencies reinforce the importance of the 
mass media. 
The media affect parties and politicians in a number of ways. They influ- 
ence how candidates speak, what issues they choose to concentrate on, what 
rallies they attend (and where), what kind of television props and sets they use, 
e t ~ . ~ ~  Politicians all over the Western world seem to adjust to the media's 
demands. As a result we are faced with a growing personalization of politics, 
shorter and more simplified messages ("sound-bite politics"),25 positions 
unsupported by arguments (what columnist George F. Will in another context 
calls " a t t i t ~ d i n i z i n ~ " ) , ~ ~  and even more of a focus on gaffes, mistakes, 
visuals, and controversy.27 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the media's influence is their 
agenda-setting power.28 Journalists, particularly television journalists, have 
become powerful players in the political arena. But how do they exercise their 
power? How do journalists go about questioning candidates on national 
television? The object of the following analysis is not to measure the media's 
influence or to weigh "media power" against the power of other important 
actors (parties, candidates, interest organizations, etc.). Instead I will briefly 
compare parts of the televised debates and question-and-answer programs in the 
two campaigns in order to determine how journalists operate in two different 
political cultures. 
Bush and Dukakis had two presidential "debates," each lasting 90 minutes 
with four journalists on the In the Swedish case, each party leader 
was interviewed in seven separate 50-minute programs by two selected jour- 
n a l i s t ~ . ~ ~  Even if there were noticeable differences in the way these programs 
were set up and conducted,31 Lbey invite a number of broad questions: 
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1) What issues were brought up in the different programs? 
2) What kind of questions were asked by the journalists? Were they pri- 
marily ideological in nature, i.e., focusing on the fundamental ideas and prin- 
ciples that the parties ran on? O r  were they rather issue questions, i.e., dealing 
with particular issues that the parties promoted in their platforms? 
3) What perspectives did the journalists use in questioning the candidates? 
Did they use a neutral perspective, an opposing one, or did they make use of 
the same perspective as that nurtured by the candidates themselves? 
The following table relates the most common issues in the Swedish pro- 
grams to broadcasting time in minutes: 
kds mp m f p  vpk s c total 
Taxes 
Budget cuts 
Environmentlenergy 
Family policy 
Trade policy 
Workers' standard 
Defense 
Schools/Education 
Leijon/Malm 
Abortion 
Traffic policy 
Research 
Table 2. 
The 12 most common issues in the seven Swedish Drograms as detailed by Hans 
Bergstrijm in "Televisionens val" (Stockholm: ~izirin~sliv& mediainstitut), report no. 
8, 1988, p. 18. Total air time was 344 minutes (after adjustments) and the average time 
per party leader was 49 minutes. The parties are: kds=Christian Democrats; mp=Greens; 
m=Moderates; fp=Liberals; vpk=Communists; s=Social Democrats; c=Center Party. 
The "Leijon/Malm category refers to the former Minister of Justice Anna-Greta Leijon 
and to the head of the blue collar union (LO) Stig Malm, who both became issues in 
the campaign. 
What is noteworthy here is the dominance of the tax issue, which alone 
accounts for 32% of total air time. It was the only issue to be brought up 
with all seven party leaders. It should be noted that the budget cut issues, 
which came in second, were only discussed in two of the programs. It should 
further be noted that the journalists' choice of issues clearly deviated from the 
voters' own preferences in this regard.32 
The American journalists, in contrast, chose to focus on the following 
issues (numbers refer to air time in minutes): 
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Bush Dukakis Total 
Defense 
Social security/welfare 
Deficit 
Campaign quality 
Selection of Vice President 
Taxes 
Inner-city programs 
Drugs 
Housing/homelessness 
Abortion 
Crimeldeath penalty 
Dukakis' image 
Table 3. 
The 12 most commonly featured issues in the two U. S. presidential debates, 1988. 
Total air time here, after adjustments, was 157 minutes. Dukakis had a total of 79 
minutes and Bush 78 minutes. The calculations pertaining to American material, based 
on video tapes of the debates, were done by Richard Holm, a graduate student in the 
Department of History, Uppsala University. 
By a sizeable margin, defense was considered to be the most important issue 
by the journalists. However, more air time was devoted to particular issues 
such as the quality of the campaign-what came to be known as "negative 
campaigning"-and Dan Quayle's qualifications to be on the ticket than to the 
housing situation, the drug problem or the plight of the homeless. In the 
same vein, Dukakis' image as being "passionless" was given more considera- 
tion than the development of U.S./Soviet relations or environmental problems 
(those came in 14th and 15th respectively).33 This way of prioritizing the 
issues is a further sign of the great importance attached to the candidates' 
character in American politics. 
Let us now see how the Swedish journalists balanced the questions they 
asked: 
kds mp m f p  vpk s c total  
Ideological questions 14 4 0 1 16 0 0 3 5 
Issue questions 31 40 45 44 12 44 44 2'76 / 
Table 4. 
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Type of questions asked in the Swedish "media election." Bergstrom, "Televisionens 
val," p. 14. Bergstrom also has a third category, "power questions," which refer to the 
parties' attitudes vis-8-vis the formation of a government. This category, which 
accounted for 33 minutes of air time, has been excluded here, because it is primarily 
applicable to the Swedish case. 
More than 80% of total air time was thus devoted to issue questions. Most 
interesting of all is that the ideological questions were reserved exclusively for 
minor parties (Christian Democrats, who are not even in Parliament, the 
Greens, and the Communists). Roughly one third of the smaller parties' time 
dealt with their basic values and ideas. In stark contrast, the journalists saw no 
reason to touch upon these aspects when questioning the leaders of the big and 
influential parties. 
Much the same was true in the United States: 
Ideological questions 0 0 0 
Issue questions 78 79 157 
Table 5. Type of questions asked.in the American "media election." 
During a total of 180 broadcast minutes, the American journalists did not ask 
one single question pertaining to the candidates' fundamental beliefs and 
values. Does this mean, then, that ideology, just as was suggested more than 
thirty years ago, has lost its power and significance in today's affluent democ- 
r a c i e ~ ? ~ ~  Clearly not; the American election campaign, at least, showed that 
values and beliefs still matter a great dea1.3~ To neglect this dimension as 
patently as was done here can hardly be justified. 
Regarding the question of journalistic perspective the parties and candidates 
were treated fairly similarly in the two countries. In Sweden there was no 
consistency in the use of any one perspective. Two of the party leaders were 
primarily questioned from an opposing perspective (the Liberal and the 
Moderate leaders), whereas three others were mostly given the same-perspec- 
tive treatment (the Communist, the Social Democratic, and the Center Party 
leaders).36 
In the American case, the figures for Dukakis were quite evenly divided. 
Bush on the other hand, possibly because of his status as an "incumbent," 
received more questions from an opposing perspective than did his rival. 
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Neutral perspective 16 20 36 
Same perspective 13 3 1 44 
Opposing perspective 49 28 77 
Table 6. Type of question pertaining to the American debates. 
Judging from the televised debates and hearings under consideration here, there 
were no visible differences as to journalistic techniques or the type of perspec- 
tives used in the two campaigns. It is true, though, that of the twelve most 
common issues brought up, only three were more or less identical (defense, 
taxes, and abortion).37 This is due to perfectly understandable political differ- 
ences and circumstances in Sweden and the United States. Further, the focus 
on individual candidates was arguably more pronounced in the American cam- 
paign, which is what one might expect in a presidential system. But the trend 
toward a more "personalized" campaign is very visible in Sweden also. In fact, 
one of the main complaints against the Swedish media's campaign coverage in 
recent years has been their inclination to follow in the footsteps of just a few 
leading politicians. 
The Trend toward "Negative Campaigning" 
Late in May, 1988, a new Gallup Poll showed Vice President Bush 16 points 
behind Mr. Dukakis. The numbers were not the worst of it. The survey also 
found that while roughly an equal number of voters liked Mr. Bush as disliked 
him, no less than five voters liked Mr. Dukakis for every one who did not. 
Alarm-bells began to ring at Bush's headquarters. The Massachusetts Governor 
had just captured the Democratic Party's nomination more swiftly and 
skilfully than they had anticipated. To make matters worse, the national head- 
lines had been dominated, all spring, by Ed Meese, Manuel Noriega, and 
White House astrologers. Now something definitely had to be done. 
Members of the Bush high command arranged for two groups of 15 
"Reagan Democrats" to be assembled in a New Jersey town, where they con- 
ducted the first "market test" of campaign material on the Democratic nomi- 
nee. One of the researchers told the groups in no uncertain terms about Mas- 
sachusetts' prisoner furlough program, about pollution in Boston Harbor, 
about the Governor's veto of legislation requiring classes to recite the Pledge 
of Allegiance, and about other unpleasant things. All 30 of the New Jerseyites 
had been Dukakis supporters at the start of the evening. By the end of it, half 
of them had defected. "I realized right there," said the Bush campaign manager 
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Lee Atwater, "that we had the wherewithal to win, and that the sky was the 
limit on Dukakis's negatives."38 
The Bush team found, after having worked with the test groups, that a 
campaign attacking Mr. Dukakis, rather than lauding their own candidate's 
strengths, was indeed effective. What followed was wave after wave of com- 
mercials more negative than in any presidential campaign since the dawn of 
television. To be sure, presidential contenders have certainly attacked each 
other in past campaigns; Lyndon Johnson's famous "Daisy Girl" commercial 
in the 1964 election easily comes to mind. But that particular ad, branding 
Barry Goldwater as a dangerous warmonger, was broadcast only once. The 
Bush-and later Dukakis-ads were on the air night after night, to the dismay 
of enlightened voters. The 1988 campaign is the first one where the candidates 
have used advertising at least as much to bash the other side as to promote 
themselves.39 
The Vice President's camp took a deliberate risk when embarking upon a 
strategy of negative campaigning. The traditional view has been that a candi- 
date who attacks his opponent harshly or unfairly will inevitably see his per- 
sonal ratings drop. For some reason Bush managed to defy that political con- 
~ e n t i o n . ~ ~  A series of polls actually indicate that the attacks contributed sig- 
nificantly to Bush's ultimate victory. The emotionally charged issues of the 
death penalty and the furlough of murderer-rapist Willie Horton, Jr. were 
especially effective in swinging key voter groups to the GOP candidate.41 
The Swedish campaign, in comparison, was quite tame and calm. To the 
untrained eye, it almost seemed to convey a picture of a "kinder, gentler 
nation." But there is more to Swedish politics-as-usual than meets the eye. 
One episode in the campaign merits special attention, since it tells us some- 
thing interesting about campaign tactics in general and hegemony in Swedish 
party politics in particular. 
In every campaign, the Social Democrats pick a main adversary, usually 
one of the three non-socialist parties (or all of them). This is not only a way 
of combatting indifference and rallying the party faithful against an especially 
insidious enemy. Above all it gives the Social Democratic leadership an 
opportunity to determine the pattern of conflict in a campaign, which is tan- 
tamount to determining, by and large, how the election will be covered in the 
media. This may be just as important for a political party as being able to 
influence what issues are brought to the fore in a campaign.42. 
The Social Democrats have traditionally been highly successful in deter- 
mining the pattern of conflict in Swedish elections. In 1988 the Liberals were 
chosen as the chief adversaries, partly because of their tax proposal which was 
described as an unjust give-away to the rich. The Liberals were subjected to 
harsh criticism by Social Democratic candidates all across the country in what 
looked like a carefully orchestrated campaign. Some leading Social Democrats 
SWEDISH APTD AMERICAN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 8 1 
made fun of the Liberal Party leader's technocratic image and accused him of 
having a poorly programmed brain. The Liberal leader did not take this critique 
lightly. In a series of speeches he attacked the ruling party for using sleazy 
campaign tactics unworthy of a free and democratic society. He warned that, 
because of their behavior, the Social Democrats had ruined every chance of 
continuing the cooperative spirit in domestic affairs for a long time to 
come.43 
The episode just mentioned by no means dominated the Swedish election 
campaign, but it is still indicative of what seems to be a common trend in 
may contemporary Western democracies. Candidates and parties increasingly 
tend to focus on their opponents' vices first and on their own virtues second. 
This tendency is magnified in a presidential system such as the American one, 
where so much time and effort is put into promoting individual candidates 
through television advertising. In a political culture like Sweden, devoid of 
television commercials and with an established party system, negative cam- 
paigning still, in the main, takes the form of criticizing issues and ideologies 
rather than personalities.44 
What will be the shape of campaigns to come? Will the negative tactics 
continue, or will there be a backlash against this technique? The prospects for 
"cleaner" campaigns seem gloomy. With so much at stake, with television 
playing such a dominant role, and with an apparent lack of crucial, substantive 
issues, the trend toward negative campaigning is likely to continue. In the 
United States, the mass media's intense interest in covering attacks and 
controversy may be particularly decisive. By his effective use of television, 
Mr. Bush may very well have set a precedent for many campaigns to come. 
The Trend toward a Depolitization of Politics 
Another trend worthy of some attention is the tendency toward a depolitization 
of politics, noticeable in both the United States and in Sweden. The trend 
takes three principal forms to be considered briefly in turn: the moralization of 
politics, the avoidance of complex, long-term issues, and the co-optation of 
controversial issues. 
Former U. S. Senator Gary Hart, twice a candidate for the highest office in 
the country, will most probably be remembered not for his policies or posi- 
tion on the issues but rather for his acquaintance with model Donna Rice. "Do 
American politicians have private lives in the media age?" asks the Washing- 
ton Post reporter Jim ~ o a ~ l a n d . ~ ~  The answer, it seems, is a resounding no. 
Everything about a candidate's personal life is now up for grabs, especially 
problems related to alcohol abuse, drugs, sexual habits, and illness. Examples 
abound. Recent Defense Secretary-designate John Tower had to forswear alco- 
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hol in a desperate attempt to save his nomination. Former Secretary of Educa- 
tion William Bennett had to pledge to give up cigarettes for fear of not being 
confirmed as the new "drug czar." And Governor Dukakis, taking a good look 
ahead at 1992, found it prudent to hold a press conference to tell the world that 
his wife Kitty was entering an alcohol-treatment clinic.46 
Thus, today it seems that private morality is more important to a candidate 
than his or her public achievements or declared stand on the issues. Candidates 
have to be beyond reproach in almost every aspect of their personal lives, 
present and past, in order to qualify for higher office. If they are not, they will 
pretty soon be subjected to "prolonged scrutiny by the media and other agents 
of the new American public morality."47 
In the wake of the assassination of Olof Palme and the many investiga- 
tions and "affairs" that followed, the Swedish mass media, too, have shown a 
growing inclination to publish stories about public officials' personal lives 
and habits. But is is hardly correct to describe this recent development as akin 
to the American situation. In general, the Swedish public and media still take 
a more relaxed and lenient view of questions of personal lifestyles and morals. 
As for the two other aspects-the avoidance and the co-optation of 
issues-both are routinely common in today's election campaigns. For exam- 
ple, the candidates in the American campaign seemed to operate on the 
assumption that the electorate neither knew nor cared about the great issues of 
the day. Both candidates concentrated largely on symbolic and emotion-charged 
issues such as crime, drugs, abortion, the environment, and ethics in 
government. Virtually no attention was paid to more long-term issues such as 
American policy in Latin America, perestroika in the Soviet Union, political 
turmoil in Eastern Europe, famine in Africa or economic development in 
~ s i a . ~ ~  In the case of co-optation, George Bush preempted Michael Dukakis 
on a number of issues, catching the Democrats off guard. In comparison, the 
Swedish Social Democrats developed a "strategy of silence" some time after 
the death of Olof Palme. One controversial issue after another was politically 
defused (drugs, social services, the Common Market, and others). The aim, in 
essence, was to cool off the debate and disarm the opposition by co-opting 
many of their issues.49 It was a strategy of "competence, not ideology," 
Swedish style, which proved quite effective in the ensuing campaign. 
The trend toward a depolitization of politics is not a very clear-cut or uni- 
form one. The advent of the "green issues" has changed the political landscape 
in many Western countries and brought new life to a withering ideological 
debate.50 It remains to be seen, however, whether these issues are lasting 
ones or if they, too, like several of the old left-right questions, will soon be 
co-opted, avoided, or otherwise depoliticized. 
SWEDISH AND AMERICAN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
Convergence or Divergence? 
There are both similarities and dissimilarities between Swedish and American 
election campaigns as revealed in the analysis of selected trends in the cam- 
paigns of 1988. Swedish politics is still pretty much sui generis, even if there 
are clear signs of change. It is still a political culture devoid of balloons and 
the usual hoopla connected with the standard American election. It still puts a 
premium on being factual and fairly decent, all within a old and ingrained 
party system. 
However, several features also point in a converging direction. The most 
important of these are the crucial role of the media, the increasing persona- 
lization of politics, and the trend toward negative campaigning. All of these 
features are in turn connected with what could well be a general converging 
tendency, namely that of depoliticizing the issues. This trend may be an 
inevitable one in highly advanced democracies, especially in times of eco- 
nomic well-being and in a political atmosphere with no overriding issue. But 
in the long run it nevertheless represents an ominous development that threat- 
ens the very soul of a democratic society: the open and vigorous debate on the 
issues. If parties and candidates keep this up, they may breed further passivity 
among the electorate and ultimately undermine their own legitimacy.51 Thus 
no one would have won, except those who seek the continued subordination of 
politics in society. 
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